The radical pluralism of the societal constitutionalism: The constitutional fragmentation

Abstract

This paper starts from the assumption that legal pluralism is a challenge for constitutionalism and argues that it is possible to harmonize the existing legal , political and social pluralism in the international community with the methodological approach of international constitutionalism, as it's evidenced by the works of some authors from different social sciences. Moreover, it is stressed that such harmonization is a requirement for the viability of international constitutionalism itself. The radical pluralism of societal constitutionalism of G. Teubner is a conception of international constitutionalism based on a sociological theory of constitutionalism that has different epistemological assumptions and produces new results: the societal constitutionalization is nothing but a set of constitutional fragments governing the activities of constitutional subjects (public and private) through constitutional rules among which, given its enormous variety, frequent interconstitucionales conflicts may arise. It also states that the societal constitutionalism of G. Teubner has important limitations to be reconciled with international constitutionalism because each constitutional fragments have their own rationality, in some cases hardly compatible with the international public interest. This constitutional plurality of fragments does not always mean a strengthening substantive or formal dimension of international constitutionalism. Conversely, it implies a devaluation that leads to irrelevance. In conclusion, it is argued that the societal constitutionalism is not always more international constitutionalism but may be much less .